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Japanese Reconnaissance Tactics
|date=1930s }}Reconnaissance Tactics used by Japanese planners during World War II, especially in the harsh conditions of the Pacific Islands changed only marginally during the war. Reconnaissance was to be done as stealthily as possible, while also allowing for harassment of the enemy. Japanese troops were often well camouflaged with jungle foliage attached to their uniforms. Doctrine Upon reaching the enemy line, reconnaissance troops were instructed to map out enemy positions. More often than not, troops would sketch them out. The highest priority targets for reconnaissance to mark were machine gun nests and mortar positions. After observation, reconnaissance troops would make their way back to their observation posts. Scouts carrying important position information were urged to take the safest way back to friendly territory, so as not to engage the enemy and potentially lose the information."British Observations of Japanese Tactics" Tactical and Technical Trends, US Military Intelligence Service Then, if possible, the most important findings would be immediately radioed back to command. In order to ascertain enemy positions, a common tactic used by Japanese scouts was to speak aloud in the language of the enemy. In Burma for example, scouts would declare "Don't Shoot! We are ----. Where are you?", in various languages including Bengali, Urdu, and English. Allied troops on the front lines promptly learned of certain words and phrases in the English language that were very difficult and nigh impossible for many Japanese troops to pronounce correctly, thus creating a working friend or foe system of identification by requesting said troops to say chosen codewords. Japanese scouts were also known to harass enemy positions by purposefully generating noise, throwing firecrackers, shouting, and firing from unexpected positions in an attempt to get Allied soldiers to reveal their positions by returning fire, though this type of harassment was generally more effective on green troops than it was experienced soldiers. As noted by Allied military leaders, perhaps one of the more critical aspects of what made the reconnaissance tactics utilized by the Japanese effective was the tenacity and dedication of the Japanese soldiers executing them. Japanese soldiers were known to crawl for miles through inhospitable terrain to infiltrate Allied lines to either map out Allied positions from an observation position or prepare an ambush. Deployment of Reconnaissance Troops Though Japanese leaders preferred using small patrol groups consisting only of a few men, it was found that in practice, larger groups were more useful in the Pacific jungles due to the fact that should the group be intercepted, a larger group has a better chance of both fending off the attack and being able to successfully deliver its intelligence. Smaller groups were still used for harassment and infiltration of enemy lines however, often taking a toll on Allied troops forced to forever stay vigilant of said infiltrators. In principle, Japanese reconnaissance troops were supposed heavily armed in the event of confrontation with the enemy. Mechanization in the Imperial Japanese Army in general was lacking, though it was not necessarily uncommon for reconnaissance troops to be equipped with trucks and or tankettes for faster reconnaissance and better protection against threats. However, this generally only occurred during the combat in China where the terrain was more open to such motorization. In the Pacific jungles that would be the backdrop for many of Japan's most important battles in the Second World War, there was little to none mechanization of any kind, let alone for reconnaissance purposes. In most cases, even horses were in short supply. As such, if heavier weapons such as anti-tank weapons or mortars could not be transported manually, they were left behind. Furthermore, most reconnaissance units in the Pacific were very much under equipped. As an example, the reconnaissance regiment attached to most Japanese infantry divisions essentially fielded three rifle companies, and an HQ. Though reconnaissance regiments were supposed to be equipped with at least two truck companies and a mounted company, in most cases, the trucks left behind and used for logistics and the infantry walked.Rottman L. Gordon, World War II Combat Reconnaissance Tactics. Osprey Publishing (2007), Page 57 Furthermore, since the few Japanese radios available were typically of inferior quality than their Allied counterparts, and telephone lines were constantly being destroyed in combat, orders from commanders to prepare their troops for morning offensives were often carried by messenger under the cover of darkness. If the runner was intercepted by enemy action or did not arrive at his destination, entire units would simply be left without orders. More importantly, should the enemy change tactics between the time runners have delivered their messages, Japanese commanders could quickly find themselves performing the completely wrong course of action for the situation. History The reconnaissance tactics that would be used throughout the Pacific War by the Japanese army were developed and refined throughout the early to late 1930s during Japan's rearmament. The first proper testing ground for their effectiveness naturally presented itself in the form of the Japanese campaigns in China. In the Chinese theater, Japanese reconnaissance capabilities proved sufficient for Japanese commanders, leading to little incentive to improve upon them. Though reconnaissance tactics generally proved themselves to be sufficient once again for Japanese military commanders in the Pacific, Allied planners studying Japanese tactics were quickly able to predict with great efficiency Japanese patrol patterns and thus negate their reconnaissance potential. Furthermore, what little reconnaissance was gained before an operation was often discarded or misused by overzealous Japanese commanders seeking to make temporary gains through aggressive and uncoordinated attacks, inevitably leading to costly casualties. References Category:Tactics Category:Japanese Tactics